Abstract. We consider secure multi-party computation in the asynchronous model and present an efficient protocol with optimal resilience. For n parties, up to t < n/3 of them being corrupted, and security parameter κ, a circuit with c gates can be securely computed with communication complexity O(cn 3 κ) bits. In contrast to all previous asynchronous protocols with optimal resilience, our protocol requires access to an expensive broadcast primitive only O(n) times -independently of the size c of the circuit. This results in a practical protocol with a very low communication overhead. One major drawback of a purely asynchronous network is that the inputs of up to t honest parties cannot be considered for the evaluation of the circuit. Waiting for all inputs could take infinitely long when the missing inputs belong to corrupted parties. Our protocol can easily be extended to a hybrid model, in which we have one round of synchronicity at the end of the input stage, but are fully asynchronous afterwards. In this model, our protocol allows to evaluate the circuit on the inputs of every honest party.
Introduction
Secure multi-party computation. The goal of secure multi-party computation (MPC) is to allow a set of n players to evaluate an agreed function of their inputs in a secure way, where security means that an adversary corrupting some of the players cannot achieve more than controlling the inputs and outputs of these players. In particular, the adversary does not learn the inputs of the uncorrupted players, and furthermore, she cannot influence the outputs of the uncorrupted players except by selecting the inputs of the corrupted players.
We consider a static active t-adversary who can corrupt up to t of the players and take full control over them. Furthermore, we focus on asynchronous communication, i.e., the messages in the network can be delayed for an arbitrary amount of time (but eventually, all messages are delivered). As a worst-case assumption,their input into the computation. However, the presented protocol can easily be extended to consider the input of each (honest) party, at the cost of one round of synchronization required at the end of the input stage.
2 Preliminaries, notation and tools
Formal model
We use the model of security of asynchronous protocols from [Can01] . Formally our model for running a protocol will be the hybrid model with a functionality for distributing some initial cryptographic keys between the parties using some function init. The ideal functionality that we wish to realize is given by a circuit Circ, or more precisely a family of circuits. Namely, the functionality allows the adversary to specify a set of at least n − t parties, W ⊆ [n] (where [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}), which are to supply the inputs to the computation. The circuit to be computed, Circ = Circ(W ), is then uniquely defined by the subset of parties providing the inputs. The informal proofs in this extended abstract do not require familiarity with specific details of the model in [Can01] , and below we only recall the needed specificities.
Asynchronous protocols. An n-player protocol is a tuple π = (P 1 , . . . , P n , init), where each P i is a probabilistic interactive Turing machine, and init is an initialization function, used for the usual set-up tasks (initialize the players, set up cryptographic keys, etc.). The parties (players) communicate over an asynchronous network, in which the delay between sending and delivery of a message is unbounded. More precisely, when a party sends a message, this message is added to the set of messages already sent but not yet delivered, Msg = {(i, j, m)}, where (i, j, m) denotes a message m from P i to P j . The delivery of the messages is scheduled by the adversary (see below).
We assume that the function to be computed is given as a circuit consisting of input gates augmented by the party to supply the input, linear gates and multiplication gates, and output gates augmented by the party to see the output, all over some ring M.
Adversary. We consider a polynomially bounded adversary, and our constructions are parametrized by a security parameter κ. The adversary controls the delivery of messages and can corrupt up to t parties. A corrupted party is under full control of the adversary, which sees all incoming messages, and determines all outgoing messages. The adversary schedules the delivery of the messages arbitrarily, by picking a message (i, j, m) ∈ Msg and delivering it to the recipient. The adversary doesn't see the contents of messages exchanged between honest (i.e., not corrupted) parties, and any message from an honest party to an honest party is eventually delivered. In most cases we require that t < n/3, but will sometimes consider other thresholds. The set of parties to be corrupted is specified by the adversary before the execution of the protocol, i.e., we consider static security.
Execution of a protocol. Before the protocol starts, an initialization function init is evaluated on the security parameter 1 κ and on random input r ∈ {0, 1} * , to generate a tuple (sv 1 , . . . , sv n , pv) = init(κ, r) of secret values sv i and a public value pv. Each party P i is initialized with (1 κ , sv i , pv). At the beginning of the protocol execution, every party P i receives its input value x i from the environment, and produces some initial messages (i, ·, ·) which are added to the set Msg. The adversary is given the public value pv, the values (x j , sv j ) for each corrupted party P j , and the control over the set Msg. Subsequently the protocol is executed in a sequence of activations. In each activation the adversary picks a message (i, j, m) ∈ Msg and delivers it to P j . Upon delivery of a message, party P j performs some computation based on its current state, updates its state and produces some messages of the form (j, ·, ·), which are added to the set Msg. In some activation the parties can produce the output to the environment and terminate. The adversary determines the inputs x i and all messages of corrupted parties. The adversary and the environment can communicate with each other.
Security. The security of a protocol is defined relative to an ideal evaluation of the circuit by requiring that for any adversary attacking the execution of the protocol there exists a simulator which can simulate the attack of the adversary to any environment given only an ideal process for evaluating the circuit. In the ideal process the simulator has very restricted capabilities: It sees the inputs of the corrupted parties. Then it specifies a subset W ⊆ [n] of the parties to be the input providers, under the restriction that |W | ≥ n − t. The set W is used to pick the circuit Circ = Circ(W ) to be evaluated. The input gates of Circ are assigned the inputs of the corresponding parties (the adversary specifies the inputs of the corrupted parties), then Circ is evaluated and the outputs of the corrupted parties are shown to the simulator. Given these capabilities the simulator must then simulate to the environment the entire view of an execution of the protocol, including the messages sent and the possible communication between the environment and the adversary.
In the following subsections we briefly describe cryptographic tools needed in our constructions, and introduce a notation for their use in the rest of the paper.
Homomorphic public-key encryption with threshold decryption
We assume the existence of a semantically secure probabilistic public-key encryption scheme, which also is homomorphic and enables threshold decryption:
Encryption and decryption. For an encryption key e and a decryption key d, let e : M × R → C denote the encryption function mapping (plaintext, randomness) pair (c, r) ∈ M × R to a ciphertext C ∈ C, and let ¡ d : C → M denote the corresponding decryption function. We require that M is a ring Z M for some M > 1, and we use · to denote multiplication in M. We often use capital letters to denote an encryption of the corresponding lower-case letter. When keys are understood, we write and ¡ instead of e resp. ¡ d , and we frequently omit the explicit mention of the randomness in encryption function .
Homomorphic property. We require that there exist (efficiently computable) binary operations +, * , and ⊕, such that (M, +), (R, * ), and (C, ⊕) are algebraic groups, and that e is a group homomorphism, i.e. that (a, r a ) ⊕ (b, r b ) = (a + b, r a * r b ) .
We use A B to denote A ⊕ (−B), where −B denotes the inverse of B in the group C. For an integer a and B ∈ C we use a · B to denote the sum of B with itself a times in C. Ciphertext re-randomization. For C ∈ C and r ∈ R we let e (C, r) = C ⊕ e (0, r). We use C = e (C) to denote C = e (C, r) for uniformly random r ∈ R. We call C = e (C) a re-randomization of C. Note that C is a uniformly random encryption of
Threshold decryption. We require that there exists a threshold function sharing of ¡ d among n parties, i.e., for some construction threshold 1 < t D ≤ n there exists a sharing (d 1 , . . . , d n ) of the decryption key d (where d i is intended for party P i ), such that given decryption shares c i =
Furthermore, the encryption scheme should be still semantically secure against chosen plaintext attack when the adversary is given t D − 1 decryptionkey shares. Finally, we require that given a ciphertext C, plaintext c = ¡ d (C), and a set of t D − 1 decryption-key shares {d i }, it is possible to compute all n decryption shares c j = ¡ j,dj (C), j = 1, . . . , n. We will always have t D = t + 1. When keys are understood, we write ¡ i (C) to denote the function computing decryption share of party P i for ciphertext C, and c = ¡ (C, {c i }) to denote the process of combining the decryption shares {c i } to a plaintext c.
Robustness. To efficiently protect against cheating servers we require that there exists an efficient two-party zero-knowledge protocol for proving the correctness of a decryption share c i = ¡ i,di (C) given (e, C, c i ) as instance, and given (i, d i ) and randomness r as witness. We require also that there exists an efficient two-party zero-knowledge protocol for proving the knowledge of a plaintext, given (e, C) as instance and the corresponding plaintext c and randomness r as witness. Finally, we require an efficient two-party zero-knowledge "proof of correct multiplication" (cf. [CDN01] ): given a triple of ciphertexts (R, U, A) one shows that U is a randomization of the product r ·a, where r, a are the plaintexts of R, A, respectively. We require that these protocols communicate O(κ) bits per proof.
Digital signatures
We assume the existence of a digital signature scheme unforgeable against an adaptive chosen message attack. For a signing key s and a verifying key v, let Sign s : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ denote the signing function, and let Ver v : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} denote the verifying function, where Ver v (m, σ) = 1 indicates that σ is a valid signature on m. We write Sign i /Ver i to denote the signing/verification operation of party P i .
Threshold signatures
We assume the existence of a threshold signature scheme unforgeable against an adaptive chosen message attack. For a signing key s and a verifying key v, let s : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ denote the signing function, and let
κ → {0, 1} denote the verifying function, where ¡ v (m, σ) = 1 indicates that σ is a valid signature on m. Threshold signing. We require that there exists a threshold function sharing of s among n parties, i.e., for some signing threshold 1 < t S ≤ n there exists a sharing (s 1 , . . . , s n ) of the signing key s (where s i is intended for party P i ), such that given signature shares σ i = i,si (m) for t S distinct signing-key shares s i , it is possible to efficiently compute σ such that ¡ v (m, σ) = 1. The threshold signature scheme should be still unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack when the adversary is given t S − 1 signing-key shares. Finally, we require that given a signature σ on m, and t S − 1 signing-key shares {s i }, it is possible to compute all n signature shares σ j = j,sj (m), j = 1, . . . , n. We will always have t S = n−t. When keys are understood, we use i (m) to denote the function computing signature share of party P i for message m, and σ = (m, {σ i }) to denote the process of combining the signature shares {σ i } to a signature σ. Robustness. To protect against cheating servers we require that there exists an efficient two-party zero-knowledge protocol for proving the correctness of a signature share σ i = i,si (m), given (v, m, σ i ) as instance and given (i, s i ) as witness. We require that this protocol communicates O(κ) bits per proof.
Byzantine agreement
We assume the existence of a Byzantine agreement (BA) protocol, i.e., a protocol with the following properties: The input of party P i is a bit v i ∈ {0, 1} and the output of the BA is a bit w ∈ {0, 1}. If all honest parties enter the BA, then the BA eventually terminates. Furthermore, if the BA terminates with output w, then some honest party entered the BA with input v i = w. In particular, if all honest parties have the same input v i = v, then the output of the BA is w = v.
Cryptographic assumptions and instantiations of tools
The security of our constructions is based on decisional composite residuosity assumption (DCRA) [Pai99] . Alternatively, it could be based also on QRA and strong RSA. We stress, that our constructions are in the plain model. In particular, our constructions do not make use of random oracles. Homomorphic encryption with threshold decryption. An example of a scheme satisfying all required properties is Paillier's cryptosystem [Pai99] enhanced by threshold decryption as in [FPS00, DJ01] . In this scheme M = Z N for an RSA modulus N . Another example can be based on the QR assumption and the strong RSA assumption. [CDN01] . Digital signatures. As our digital signature scheme we use standard RSA signatures [RSA78] .
Threshold signatures. As an example we can use the threshold signature scheme by Shoup [Sho00] . The security of the threshold signature scheme in [Sho00] is based on the assumption that standard RSA signatures are secure. As presented in [Sho00] the zero-knowledge proofs are non-interactive but for the random-oracle model. The protocol can be modified to be secure in the plain (random oracle devoid) model by using interactive proofs (cf. [Nie02] ).
Byzantine agreement. In our protocols we employ the efficient Byzantine agreement protocol of Cachin et al. [CKS00] , which has expected constant round complexity, and expected bit complexity of O(n 2 κ). As presented in [CKS00] the security proof of the protocol needs the random-oracle methodology (for the above mentioned threshold signature scheme). This protocol also can be modified to be secure in the plain model [Nie02] .
The new protocol
Our protocol follows the paradigm of secure multi-party computation based on a threshold homomorphic encryption scheme, as introduced by Franklin and Haber [FH96] , and made robust by Cramer, Damgård and Nielsen [CDN01] . However, both protocols use synchrony in an essential manner. A high-level overview. The protocol proceeds in three stages, an input stage, an evaluation stage, and a termination stage. In the following, we briefly summarize the goal of each stage:
-Input stage: Every player provides an encryption of his input to every other player, and the players jointly agree on a subset of players who have correctly provided their inputs. -Evaluation stage: Every player independently evaluates the circuit on a gateby-gate basis, with help of the other players. The circuit consists of linear gates, multiplication gates, and output gates. The circuit may depend on the selected subset of players that have provided input. -Termination stage: As soon as a player has completed the circuit evaluation, he moves into the termination stage, where the players jointly agree that the circuit evaluation is completed, every player has received (or will eventually receive) the output(s), and hence every player who is still in the evaluation stage can safely abort it.
By having every player evaluate the circuit on his own, we bypass the inherent synchronicity problems of the asynchronous model. We denote the player that evaluates the circuit as the king, and all other players (who support the king) the slaves. Note that every player acts (in parallel) once as king, and n times as slave, once for every king. The kings are not synchronized among each other; it can happen that one king has almost completed the evaluation of the circuit, while another king is still at the very beginning. However, each slave is synchronized with his king. As soon as the first king completes the evaluation and provably reveals all outputs, all other kings (and their slaves) can safely truncate their own evaluation.
In order to achieve robustness, we must require every party to prove (in zero-knowledge) the correctness of essentially every value she provides during the protocol execution. These proofs could easily be constructed in the randomoracle model (by using Fiat-Shamir heuristics), but this would be at the costs of a non-standard model. We therefore follow another approach: A party who is to prove some claim, proves this claim interactively to every other party. The verifying party then certifies that she has correctly verified the claim. Once the prover has collected enough such certificates, she can convince any third party noninteractively of the validity of the claim. Technically, we use threshold signatures for the certificates, which allows the prover to compute one short certificate that proves that t S parties have verified his proof (recall that t S denotes the threshold of the threshold signature scheme, and we set t S = n − t). Formally, we will say that "a party P i constructs and sends a proof π i of << some claim >> ", denoted as π i = proof( << some claim >> ), when we mean that P i bilaterally proves the claim in zero-knowledge to every party P j , who then, upon successful completion of the proof, sends to P i a signature share j ( << some claim >> ). After obtaining t S correct signature shares 3 {π i,j } j∈I , party P i computes π i as ( << some claim >> , {π i,j } j∈I ). Since this construction is standard, we omit the details from the description of the protocols. Naturally, we do include the corresponding subprotocols and their bit complexities in the analysis of the proposed solution (cf. Section 3.8).
Finally we note that we make use of threshold signatures also explicitly, as specified in the descriptions of the protocols. Their use there has similar purpose, namely as certificates for the validity of certain claims.
Main protocol
The main protocol first invokes the input stage, then the evaluation stage, and finally the termination stage. At the end of the input stage, the circuit Circ is determined by the set of parties that provide input. In the evaluation stage, every party starts one instance of the king protocol, and n instances of the slave protocol -one for every king.
In order to precisely describe the new protocol, we first formally model the circuit to be computed, and then give the invariant that is satisfied during the whole computation. For the clarity of presentation we assume in the following that every party provides at most one input value and that there is only one final output value to be disclosed to all parties (i.e., the final output is to be public). This is without loss of generality for the case with public outputs, and protocols for the general case with multiple input/output values can be derived by straightforward modifications. However, the issue of providing private outputs is more involved, and we discuss it in Section 4.1.
The circuit. We assume that the function to be computed is given as a circuit Circ over the plaintext space M of the homomorphic encryption scheme in use. The circuit is a set of labeled gates, where each label is a unique bit-string G ∈ {0, 1} * . We use G(Circ) to denote the set of all labels of the circuit Circ. In the following we let v : G(Circ) → M ∪ {⊥} be a map from the labels into the the plaintext space, where v(G) denotes the value of the gate G. Each gate is represented by a tuple (G, . . .), and can have one of the following types:
input gate: (G), consisting only of its label G = (P i , input), where v(G) is equal to x i , the input value provided by player P i .
is the output value of the circuit.
Correctness invariant. Throughout the computation each party P i maintains a data structure containing the views of each party P j on the intermediate values in the circuit. More precisely, P i holds a dictionary Γ i , which for each party P j maps labels G to encryptions computed by the King P j ,
where initially Γ i (j, G) =⊥ for all labels and all j ∈ [n]. If Γ i (j, G) = C =⊥, then from P i 's point of view gate G was completed by P j , and C is a ciphertext of the homomorphic encryption scheme of the value v(G). We say that C is the encryption of v(G) reported by P j to P i , and that P i has accepted C from P j . The protocol guarantees, that if an honest party P i accepts a ciphertext C reported by P j , then C is an encryption of a correct value for gate G. Moreover, any two honest parties who accept an encryption of any party P l for a gate G agree on the encryption. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (Correctness Invariant). The following properties hold at any point in the protocol:
and such that for all honest parties having defined the circuit Circ i it holds that Circ i = Circ(W ). 2. (Agreement on input encryptions) For all pairs of honest parties P i , P j , and all k, l, m ∈ W it holds that if
is identical to the value of gate G obtained by decrypting the input encryptions held by P i and evaluating the circuit on the plaintexts. 4. (Agreement on encryptions of gates by same king) For every two honest parties P i and P j , for any l ∈ [n] and any
This invariant is propagated from the initial input stage until the output stage is reached. Hence, a threshold decryption of the encrypted output value is guaranteed to yield correct computation results.
The basis of the correctness invariant. The correctness invariant is established in the input stage, which determines the values of all input gates. Due to the security properties of the input-stage protocol, these values are guaranteed to be correct in the sense that the each party providing input knows the actual value hidden in the encryption, and that this value is a valid input to the function to be computed.
Input stage
The goal of the input stage is to define an encryption of the input of each party.
To ensure independence of the inputs, the parties are required to prove plaintext knowledge for their encryptions. In a synchronous network we could simply let the parties broadcast their encryptions. However, in an asynchronous setting with an active adversary we cannot guarantee that each party contributes an input value, since it is impossible to distinguish between an honest slow party and a corrupted party. Therefore a protocol is used which selects (n−t) so-called input providers. First, each party P i encrypts its input value x i to obtain a ciphertext X i = (x i ), and constructs a proof π i = proof( << P i knows the plaintext in X i >> ) (using bilateral zero-knowledge proofs and threshold signatures), which serves as a certificate that P i knows the encrypted value, and that X i is P i 's unique possible input encryption to the circuit. Afterwards P i distributes (X i , π) to all parties, and then constructs and distributes another certificate, a certificate of distribution cert i , stating that P i has distributed (X i , π i ) to at least n − t parties (recall that n − t is the threshold of the signature scheme).
When a party collects n − t certificates of distributions it knows that at least n − t parties have their certified inputs distributed to at least n − t parties. So, at least n − t parties had its certified input distributed to at least (n − t) − t ≥ t + 1 honest parties. So, if all honest parties echo the certified inputs they saw and collect n − t echoes, then all honest parties will end up holding the certified input of the n − t parties which had their certified inputs distributed to at least t + 1 honest parties. These n − t parties will eventually be the input providers. To determine who they are, n Byzantine agreements are run. The protocol for selecting input providers is given in more detail in Figure 1. 
Computing linear gates
Due to the homomorphic property of encryption linear gates can be computed locally, without interaction. That is, if a party P i has accepted P j 's encryptions of inputs to a linear gate (G, linear, a 0 , G 1 , a 1 , . . . , G l , a l ), i.e. when Γ i (j, G u ) =⊥,
where A 0 is a "dummy" encryption of a 0 , computed using a publicly-known, fixed random string.
To define an initial set of inputs, Pi with initial input xi ∈ M proceeds as follows: Initialize empty sets Ai, i, Bi, 
, {σj }); send (Xi, certi) to all parties. 5. collect n − t signature shares {σ j } on
, {σ j }); send cert i to all parties. Grant Certificate of Uniqueness:
on the first msg. (Xj, πj) from Pj , with
on the first message (Xj , certj ) from Pj, with
on a message cert j , where
, cert j ) = 1 and j ∈ Ci, add j to Ci, and send cert j to all parties.
Select Input Providers:
When |Ci| ≥ n − t, stop executing the above rules and proceed as follows:
1. send (Ai, i ) to all parties. 2. collect a set {(Aj , j )}j∈J of (n − t) incoming, well-formed (Aj, j ). 3. let Bi := § j∈J Aj and
4. enter n Byzantine Agreements (BAs) with inputs v1, . . . , vn ∈ {0, 1}, where vj = 1 iff j ∈ Bi. 5. let w1, . . . , wn denote the outputs of the BAs, and let W = {j ∈ {1, . . . , n}|wj = 1}. 6. use W to generate a circuit Circ = Circ(W ). 7. for each j ∈ Bi ∩ W , send (Xj , certj) ∈ ¡ i to all parties. 8. for each j ∈ W wait to receive (Xj , certj ) with
, certj ) = 1. 9. for all j ∈ W and l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Γi(l, (Pj, input)) = Xj . 
Computing multiplication gates
Computation of multiplication gates is more involved. Each king P k leads the computation of the encrypted product in his copy of the circuit, that is, given a gate (G, mul,
with C 1 , C 2 =⊥, the players proceed as follows. Let c 1 , c 2 denote the values hidden in the ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 , respectively. First a randomizer (R, U, cert) is generated, where R is a threshold encryption of a random element r ∈ M Wait until input stage is completed, resulting in a circuit Circ and an initialized dictionary Γ k . Then concurrently execute for each linear, multiplication, or output gate: linear gate (G, linear, a0, a1, G1 , . . . , a l , G l ):
1. wait until Γ k (k, Gu) =⊥, for all u = 1 . . . l.
compute
1. wait until Γ k (k, G1) = C1 =⊥ and Γ k (k, G2) = C2 =⊥ 2. generate a randomizer (R, U, cert) for G, and send it to all parties:
(a) collect a set SG := {(Ri, Ui, σi, πi)}i∈I G , with |IG| ≥ t + 1, where
, and πi = proof(£ £ Pi knows ri in Ri, and Ui is a randomization of riC1¤
where each zi is a decryption share of Pi for Z = C2 ⊕ R, and φi is the corresponding validity proof 4. send VG to all parties 5. decrypt z := ¤ (Z, VG) and compute
with corresponding validity proofs i 3. compute and output c := ¤ (C, {ci}); mark G as decrypted
Fig. 2:
The code for king P k for evaluating the circuit.
(unknown to the parties and the adversary), U = (rC 1 ), i.e., U is a random threshold encryption of rc 1 , and cert is a certificate of the encryptions' correctness. Then P k sends the randomizer to all parties, and waits until the parties answer with decryption shares of the ciphertext Z = C 2 ⊕ R, which is an encryption of z = c 2 + r. Once sufficiently many (i.e., at least t D ) decryption shares arrive, P k sends them to all parties, which allows each P i to decrypt z, and compute an encryption of the product c 1 c 2 , using the homomorphic property of the encryption, and the fact that c 1 c 2 = (c 2 + r)c 1 − rc 1 . That is, P i computes
Output stage
When P i notices that the computation of an output gate (G, output, G ) is completed by some king P k (i.e. Γ i (k, G) = C =⊥), but the gate has not been decrypted so far, then P i sends a decryption share c i of C to P k along with a
Wait until input stage is completed, resulting in a circuit Circ and an initialized dictionary Γi. Then concurrently execute the following for each linear, multiplication, or output gate:
linear gate (G, linear, a0, a1, G1, . . . , a l , G l ) (only for i = k):
1. wait until Γi(k, Gu) =⊥, for all u = 1 . . . l.
compute
1. wait until Γi(k, G1) = C1 =⊥ and Γi(k, G2) = C2 =⊥ 2. help to generate a randomizer (R, U, cert) for G:
(a) compute Ri = ¢ (ri) and Ui = (riC1) for a randomly picked ri ∈ M compute σi :
Pi knows ri in Ri, and Ui is a randomization of riC1¤
) (e) send certi to king P k 3. wait until received (R, U, cert) from P k , with ); send (ci, i) to P k Fig. 3 : The code for slave P i helping king P k to evaluate the circuit.
proof that the decryption share is correct. Then P k collects enough decryption shares, and computes the value of the output gate.
Termination
As described above each king P k will eventually learn the value of the output gate. This however requires that each slave P i keeps running after king P k learned the output values. To allow to also terminate the slaves, the parties execute a termination protocol. When king P k learns the output of the circuit it outputs it and echos the result to all parties as its vote for the output (and does not yet terminate slave P k ). Since all honest parties compute identical outputs and there are at most t corrupted parties, if a party receives t + 1 identical votes for some output value it can safely adopt this value as its own output, terminate its own king, and then echo the adopted output value. When a party receives (n − t) identical votes for the output value it terminates the protocol. This is essentially a Bracha broadcast of the output value and allows all parties to eventually terminate.
Security analysis
Our protocol can be proved secure in the model described in Section 2. A formal proof that the protocol can be simulated can be given along the lines of the proof in [CDN01] , using the following helping lemmas.
Lemma 1 (The correctness invariant). The Properties 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Definition 1 hold at any point in the protocol if there are at most t < n/3 corrupted parties.
Lemma 2 (Termination). If all honest parties start running the protocol and there are at most t < n/3 corrupted parties, then all honest parties will eventually terminate the protocol.
We first sketch proofs of the lemmas, and then we discuss how the lemmas allow to give a proof along the lines of [CDN01] .
Proof of Lemma 1. (sketch) We first prove that Property 1 is an invariant. Until the first honest party reaches Step 5 in Select Input Providers in Fig. 1 we can take W to be any subset of size n − t. After that we take W to be the set define in Step 5 by the first honest party. That the parties agree on W and thereby Circ(W ) follows from the fact that W is defined by Byzantine agreements. It remains to argue that |W | ≥ n − t. Since |C i | ≥ n − t for all honest parties P i reaching Step 5 in Select Input Providers in Fig. 1 it is sufficient to show the stronger claim that (∪ i∈H C i ) ⊆ W , where H denotes the set of honest parties reaching Step 5. To see this, notice that if j ∈ C i , then P i saw cert j where (cert j , << I hold P j 's input >> ) = 1. This means that at least (n−t)−t ≥ t+1 honest parties P l issued a signature share on << I hold P j 's input >> in Grant Certificate of Distribution and added (X j , cert j ) to A l . This was done before P l reached Step 1 in Select Input Providers (at which point P l stops executing other rules than Select Input Providers). So, (X j , cert j ) is in the set A l of at least t + 1 honest parties at Step 1 in Select Input Providers. Since (t + 1) + (n − t) > n, this means that every honest party P m reaching Step 3 will have (X j , cert j ) in B l and will enter the Byzantine agreement with v j = 1. So, all parties will have w j = 1 and so j ∈ W , as desired. Now we argue that Property 2 is an invariant. If Γ i (k, (P l , input)) =⊥, then P i saw a value (X l , cert l ) for which ¡ ( << X l is P l 's input >> , cert l ) = 1. It is therefore enough to argue that there exists a unique such value (X l , cert l ). This follows from the fact that in Fig. 1 each of the honest parties issues at most one signature share on a message of the form << · is P l 's input >> .
4
We then argue that Property 3 is an invariant. Clearly Property 3 holds for all input encryptions of P k . Furthermore, if Property 3 holds for the encryptions
Step 1 in linear gate in Fig. 2 , then it clearly holds for the result Γ k (k, G), by the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. We then consider the multiplication protocol. Assume first that it holds for (R, U ) in Step 2(c) in multiplication gate in Fig. 2 that
Step 4 in multiplication gate terminates. In that case, by the homomorphic properties, z = ¡ (C 2 ) + ¡ (R), and thus
, as desired. So, it is sufficient to argue that
This follows directly from the distributive law in the plaintext space and the fact that the proofs π i in Step 2(a) guarantee that (except with negligible probability)
Finally we argue that Property 4 is an invariant. For input encryptions, Property 4 follows from Property 2. Furthermore, Property 4 is clearly preserved by linear gate in Fig. 3 . So, it remains to consider the protocol in multiplication gate in Fig. 3 . For this purpose, assume that P i and P j agree on the inputs of P k to a multiplication. I.e.
Step 1 in multiplication gate in Fig. 3 . We have to argue that if Γ i (k, G) and Γ j (k, G) become defined in Step 6 in multiplication gate, then Γ i (k, G) = Γ j (k, G). Since · and are functions and
it is sufficient to demonstrate that P i and P j agree on z, C 1 and U , which would follow from agreement on Z, C 1 and U , except with negligible probability, as the decryption in Step 6 is correct, except with negligible probability, because of the proofs of correct decryption share sent 4 To sign two different messages of the form
a total of 2(n−t) signature shares are needed. So, to sign two different messages at least 2(n − t) − n = n − 2t ≥ t + 1 parties must sign more than one message of the form
. So, if there are at most t corrupted parties and honest parties sign only one value of said form, clearly at most one value is signed. along in V G . Since ⊕ is a function and Z = C 2 ⊕ R it is therefore enough to argue agreement on C 2 , R, C 1 and U . We have agreement on C 1 and C 2 by assumption. To see that P i and P j must agree an (R, U ) observe that both saw cert such that ¡ ( << (R, U ) : P k 's randomizer for G >> , cert) = 1 in Step 3. Since each honest party issues a signature share on at most one message of the form << · : P k 's randomizer for G >> (in Step 2(d)) it follows (as argued for Property 2 above) that at most one value of the form << · : P k 's randomizer for G >> was signed.
Proof of Lemma 2. (sketch) As the first step in the proof we argue that if all honest parties start running the protocol in Fig. 1 , then some honest party will eventually trigger the rule Select Input Providers. Consider namely a dead-locked execution where this did not happen. In such an execution all honest parties are still executing all rules. So, by the rules Grant Certificate of Uniqueness and Grant Certificate of Distribution all honest parties obviously reached Step 6 in the rule Double Distribution. So, by the rule Echo Certificate of Distribution, the set B i eventually grew to size n − t at all honest parties, and so the rule Select Input Providers was eventually triggered by all honest parties, a contradiction. Now consider any execution where at least one honest party, P i , triggered Select Input Providers. This party has |C i | ≥ n − t and therefore sent at least n−t certificates cert j to all other parties in the rule Echo Certificate of Distribution. Therefore all honest parties P l will eventually have |C l | ≥ n − t and trigger Select Input Providers. It is then clear that all honest parties will eventually reach Step 8 in Select Input Providers and start waiting for (X j , cert j ) for each j ∈ W . So, it is sufficient to argue that all (X j , cert j ) eventually arrive in Step 8. To see this, observe that if j ∈ W , then at least one honest party P i had j ∈ B i in Step 4. This P i will eventually reach Step 7 and send (X j , cert j ) to all parties, and (X j , cert j ) will thus eventually arrive.
We have proven that if all honest parties start running the protocol in Fig. 1 , then all honest parties eventually terminate the protocol in Fig. 1 . Assume then for now that at least one honest party, P i , reaches Step 2 in rule 3 in Fig. 4 (with some output v).
This means that P i saw at least n − t parties vote for the value v. So, at least one honest party, P j , must have voted for v (triggered rule 1 with the value of the decryption being v). Let P j denote the first honest party to vote for v. Since P j is first, P j can only have seen votes from corrupted parties before voting. Therefore P j can have seen at most t votes. This implies that P j did not trigger rule 2. Since rule 1 was triggered, P j must have marked the output gate G as decrypted in Step 3 in output gate in Fig. 2 . As argued above, it follows from Lemma 1 that all honest parties, P j , computing an output v j in
Step 3 in Fig. 2 will agree on v j . So, all other honest parties than P i reaching
Step 3 in output gate in Fig. 2 will also have v j = v. So, no honest party will vote for a value different from v, unless it executed Step 2 in rule 2 for some value v = v. Since there are at most t corrupted parties, there will however be no first honest party to receive t + 1 votes for another value v .
We have established that if at least one honest honest party, P i , reaches
Step 2 in rule 3 in Fig. 4 , with output v, then all honest parties which vote will vote for the value v. In particular, all honest party which terminated voted for v.
Recall that we assumed that at least one honest party, P i , terminated with output v. For P i to terminate with output v, P i must have seen n − t votes for v. This implies that at least (n − t) − t ≥ t + 1 honest parties voted for v. These honest parties sent their vote to all parties. Therefore all honest parties P j which did not terminate eventually received t+1 votes for v, which first triggered rule 2 and then triggered rule 1 to make P j vote for the value v. In particular, all honest party which did not terminate voted for v.
Since each honest party which terminated voted for v and each honest party which did not terminate voted for v we have that all honest parties voted for v. This means that all honest parties which did not terminate eventually received n − t votes for v and, well, terminated.
We showed above that if all honest parties terminate the input phase and at least one honest party reaches Step 2 in rule 3 in Fig. 4 , then all honest parties eventually terminate. Since the protocol, by Sect. 3.8, has finite communication, what remains to prove the lemma is thus to establish that at any point in the execution where all honest parties terminated the input phase, either there is an undelivered message from an honest party to an honest party, or at least one honest party reached Step 2 in rule 3 in Fig. 4 .
Assume for the sake of contradiction that all parties terminated the input phase and that the protocol is dead-locked and that no party reached Step 2 in rule 3 in Fig. 4 . This in particular means that from the point where the input phase terminated and throughout the execution each party was running a copy of the code in Fig. 2 and a copy of the code in Fig. 3 . Since no party ever waits for more than n − t parties in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 and there are n − t honest parties and by assumption no honest party terminated, this can be seen to guarantee that no honest party dead-locked in Fig. 2 or Fig. 3 . In particular, all honest parties reached Step 3 in output gate in Fig. 2 . As argued above, this implies that all n − t honest parties voted for the same output value, which implies that all honest parties eventually reached Step 2 in rule 3. A contradiction.
As mentioned above, the proof of security of our protocol goes along the lines of [CDN01] . Below we sketch the main argument, highlighting the points where Lemmata 1 and 2 are used.
By Property 1 a set of at least n − t parties have their inputs considered, as required by the model in Section 2. Furthermore, by Property 3, the output v i obtained by P i when decrypting the output ciphertext in Step 3 in output gate in Fig. 2 will be correctly defined from the plaintexts of the input ciphertexts held by P i . Since by Property 2 the parties agree on the input ciphertexts, all honest parties P i will agree on the output v i in Step 3 in output gate. This clearly implies that all honest parties terminate the protocol in Fig. 4 with the output being the common value v, as no other value can get t + 1 votes when there are at most t corrupted parties. Since v is the result of evaluating the circuit on the plaintexts of the input ciphertexts and, by Property 2, the input ciphertext X l of honest party P l contains the correct input x l , the result v can indeed be obtained by restricting the set of input providers to a set of size at least n − t and then changing only the inputs of the corrupted parties.
The privacy of the protocol (formally defined by the simulator only being given the inputs of the corrupted parties in the simulation) mainly follows from the fact that all inputs are encrypted using a semantic secure encryption scheme and that all proofs are zero-knowledge. So, the only knowledge leaked about the inputs of the honest parties is through decryptions of ciphertexts.
The decryptions take place only in Step 4 in multiplication in Fig. 3 and  in Step 2 in output gate in Fig. 3 . By the correctness of the protocol the knowledge leaked in Step 2 in output gate is the result of the computation, which is allowed to leak by the model. So it remains to argue that no knowledge is leaked in Step 4 in multiplication. To see this, observe that the value revealed by the decryption in Step 4 is z = c 2 + i∈IG r i , which holds the potential of leaking knowledge about c 2 (which is potentially to be kept secret). Since each term r i from an honest party is chosen uniformly at random and all r i are chosen independently (this is the purpose of having all parties, in particular the corrupted parties, prove plaintext knowledge of their r i in Step 2(a)), it is sufficient to show that each revealed value z = c 2 + i∈IG r i contains at least one honest value r i which did not enter another revealed value.
Observe first of all that since |I G | ≥ t+1, at least one r i came from an honest party. Observe then that each of the randomizers r i are associated uniquely to one (P k , G) by the signature σ i (issued in Step 2(a) and checked in Step 2(c)). Therefore r i only enters values z = c 2 + i∈IG r i leaked in decryptions in Step 4 in multiplication for the specific (P k , G) in consideration. It is therefore sufficient to show that for each (P k , G) there is only one value z = c 2 + i∈IG r i for which knowledge is leaked. This follows from the uniqueness guaranteed by the threshold t S = n − t of the threshold signatures. More precisely, assume that for each king P k and each gate G at most one value of the form << · : P k 's randomizer for G >> is signed. I.e. there exists at most one value (R, U ) for which there exists cert such that ¡ ( << (R, U ) : P k 's randomizer for G >> , cert) = 1 (this can be seen to be necessary for Property 4 to hold and thus follows from Lemma 1). Since the honest parties agree on the gate encryptions of P k (by Property 4), this implies that there is at most one value Z = C 2 ⊕ R for which honest parties issue decryption shares in Step 4 for a given choice of (P k , G). Therefore each value z = c 2 + i∈IG r i on which knowledge is leaked through decryption shares from honest parties, at least one r i came from an honest party and did not enter another value on which knowledge was leaked, as desired.
Efficiency analysis
In this section we consider the communication complexity of the protocol. We omit computational complexity from the analysis, since it is clearly polynomial, and the bottleneck of distributed computing is in the communication overhead. For completeness, we consider the case where each party can have more than one input, and we denote by c I the total number of input gates. For clarity we use K = n to denote the number of kings and S = n to denote the number of slaves.
In the protocol in Fig. 1 , when each party has more than one input, X i will simply be the vector of input encryptions. Assuming that all encryptions, all signature shares, all signatures and all pairwise proofs use communication O(κ) and that the communication complexity of a Byzantine agreement is O(n 2 κ), it can be seen using simple counting that the communication complexity of the protocol in Fig. 1 is O(c I n 2 κ + n 3 κ). In king's protocol (Fig. 2) 
Extensions and applications

Computing functions with private outputs
The description of the new protocol in Section 3 only considers public outputs, i.e., every party learns the output(s) of the circuit. In the following, we present an extension that allows for outputs that are delivered only to an authorized party, say P j . The intuition of the protocol is that the decryption shares are not sent to the king, but rather directly to P j . Every decryption share must go along with a proof of validity. This proof must not be interactive with P j (the parties cannot wait for messages of P j ), and the proof must not be given to other parties (this would violate the privacy of the output protocol). Therefore, we have every slave P i blind his decryption share c i with a random value r i , i.e., c i = c i + r i , encrypt r i with randomness ρ i , i.e., R i = (r i , ρ i ), and prove interactively towards every auxiliary player P j knowledge of r i such that r i encrypts to R i and c i − r i is a valid decryption share. Upon accepting the proof, every auxiliary player hands a signature share for << (c i , R i ) is a good decryption share for slave P i >> to P i , who then sends c i , r i , ρ i to P j . Given this information from at least n − t players, P j picks the valid decryption shares and decrypts his private output.
We note that a similar technique has been recently used by Schoenmakers and Tuyls [ST04] .
A hybrid model: asynchronous network with few synchronization rounds
A fully asynchronous MPC protocol inherently cannot consider the input of every honest party; once n − t inputs are ready, the protocol must start. This is a serious drawback which makes the fully asynchronous model unusable for many real-world applications. We show that with a single round of synchronization, we can consider the input of every honest party. This model seems very reasonable in real-world; the parties would wait for other parties to have their input ready, and if not, use other means of communication (email, phone, fax, etc) to synchronize. However, the MPC protocol itself should run asynchronously to comply with the properties of existing networks, namely that the delay of messages is hard to predict. Note that asynchronous protocols can be looked as "best effort" protocols where the progress in the protocol is as fast as possible with the available network, in contrast to synchronous protocols whose progress is limited by the assumed worst-case delay of the network. The necessary changes in the input protocol (cf. Fig. 1 ) are minimal: Every player P i moves to the last stage (Select Input Providers) only when either |C i | = n, or the synchronization round elapsed.
Non-robust computations
In the proposed protocol, robustness is guaranteed by having each party act as king, who evaluates the whole circuit on his own (with help of his slaves). This means that the computation and communication overhead for achieving robustness is a factor of n.
Goldwasser and Lindell have proposed a model for secure MPC in which output delivery is not guaranteed [GL02] , unless some a priori specified party is honest. In this model, we can improve the communication complexity of our protocol by a factor of n, simply be letting this designated party act as king, and all other parties act as his slaves. We stress that the protocol still guarantees privacy and correctness of the computation, but termination (with output delivery) can only be guaranteed when the king is honest. This simplified protocol achieves an overall communication complexity of O(cn 2 κ) for a circuit of size c and a security parameter κ.
Conclusions
We have proposed a secure multi-party computation protocol which substantially puts forward both theory and practice in this field. From a theoretical point of view, the protocol is optimally resilient, fully asynchronous, and has an asymptotically lower communication complexity than any previous asynchronous MPC protocol. Indeed, the protocol is as efficient as the most efficient known protocol for synchronous communication. Furthermore, the protocol requires very few invocations of the broadcast primitive (independent of the size of the computed circuit).
From a practical point of view, the new protocol is designed for real-world networks with unknown message delay, allows every party to provide his input under a very reasonable assumption (one round of synchronization), and achieves best-possible resilience against cheating (up to a third of the parties may misbehave). Furthermore, the protocol is very efficient, the constant communication overhead is minimal. The effective computation of the circuit takes less than 10n 3 κ bits of communication per multiplication, which makes the protocol applicable for reasonably sized circuits among small sets of parties. The key set-up (for the threshold decryption and threshold signatures) is more communicationintensive; however, this can be performed long in advance.
